

Air Pouch

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~~SECRET/RYBAT/PBSUCCESS~~

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Chief of Station, Guatemala

LINCOLN

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

K-Program
Reply to GUAT 375

2003

ATTN: Graham L. PAGE

1. In accordance with your request, there is submitted herewith a concise statement for your adaptation as appropriate, to consumption.

2. The non-intervention policy of the American Government is known and established. This policy has the merit of morality and dignity in international affairs; it distinguishes the United States from the Soviet Union, with its constant intervention in the internal affairs of other states. However, the realities of international life today being what they are, the scrupulous observance by the American Government of the non-intervention policy has caused a goodly number of private and influential American citizens, both Democrats and Republicans, to chafe at it. [] should be familiar, from his study of American opinion, with the overt American expressions of resentment at some of the omissions of the American Government in international affairs—to wit, statements to the effect that the United States Government is not doing enough to aid indigenous anti-Communists throughout the world. Because of this sentiment, on numerous occasions, private American groups have banded together to support this or that anti-Communist cause in various parts of the world. Radio Free Europe is an example of such private American initiative; the Freedom Train, organized by Drew Pearson, is another; the activities of the Ford Foundation are a third.

In the case of Guatemala, a group of American individuals, influential in the press, the professions and business, and joined by personal friendship, a common interest in Latin America and common devotion to the anti-Communist cause in the Western Hemisphere, have banded together to support any legitimate,

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decent opposition to the Arbenz regime. This group, which prefers to remain anonymous, does not wish to embarrass or to burden the Guatemalan anti-Communists with political or economic commitments. The reasoning of the group on this point is very clear. The Soviet system is monolithic; the Soviets cannot brook any deviation from their commands or any disobedience to their orders; the Soviets must, in order to succeed and to survive, have the world organized strictly according to their dictates. The requirements of American democracy are quite different; America itself is a pluralistic society, composed of many diverse groups with competitive interests; each man's and each group's freedom lives by dint of the other man's and the other group's liberty; the sum total of individual liberties guarantees the survival of democracy. By the same token, in foreign affairs, enlightened American citizens recognize that a pluralistic world society, composed of many free and independent states is more useful to the American way of life than a Pax Americana. Freedom and independence, wherever they exist, are *ipso facto* hostile to the Soviet Union and therefore beneficial to the United States. Enlightened Americans, such as those who compose the group that is aiding anti-Communism in Guatemala, would therefore consider it inimical to their best efforts to attempt to detract from the independence of the Guatemalan anti-Communist movement by loading it with political entanglements.

This American group is also well aware that freedom and independence can only spring from native roots. These things must be desired by the peoples of various countries; they cannot be granted or imposed. The group therefore conceives its function to be more that of eliciting local anti-Communist strength, of supporting it and guiding it, than to control it or direct it. As previously stated, each local and individual upsurge of anti-Communism and freedom benefits the enlightened interests of American citizens and the more genuinely indigenous such an upsurge, the more beneficial to American interests and the more anti-Communist will it be.

In seeking Guatemalans whose anti-Communist activities it could support, the American group necessarily had to select exiles, both because of their accessibility and because exiles were the only ones who had sufficient freedom of speech and action to be able to make their position clear. In supporting [redacted] and CALLIGERIS, the group in no way meant to pre-judge any choice by the Guatemalan people; once it entered into relationships with these two men, the group of course felt a deep and abiding loyalty to them; but the group, nonetheless, considered and still considers these men vehicles for the benefit of the Guatemalan people and the anti-Communist cause in Guatemala. The group certainly hopes that its choice of these two men will be borne out by the public acclaim and the support they receive and it certainly hopes that these two men enjoy the public confidence at present. However, once the Guatemalan Communists are defeated, the group would assume that the normal process of political events, where the best man should win, would again take over in Guatemala.

Any and all agreements—and no written agreements between the group and [] and CALLIGERIS exist—relate only to the best way of getting the Communists out of Guatemala. At no time have any political or economic concessions on the part of the anti-Communist leaders to any foreign interests even been discussed; the only understanding that exists is that Guatemala, under an anti-Communist policy, would pursue a peaceful, non-subversive path in Hemispheric relations and that Guatemala would afford foreign economic interests such treatment as *was* consistent with the best interests of Guatemala and with the generally accepted mores of commercial intercourse between democratic peoples. The group has specifically excluded from its ranks any individuals with direct or indirect financial concern in American enterprises presently operating in Guatemala; as previously stated, the group is first and foremost interested in eliminating the Communists and it believes that sufficient benefits to the American people will flow from the accomplishment of that objective that parochial economic interests must take their turn at settlement and satisfaction only long after the primary job has been done. Furthermore, the group, operating anonymously and without any written compacts with [] and CALLIGERIS, is in no position to renege any specific political or economic guarantees. On the other hand [] and CALLIGERIS, being practical men, know full well that they are not in any position to make any promises and being devoted to Guatemala, know that they will have to consult representative segments of the Guatemalan public interest before they are in a position to treat definitively on such matters.

7. As stated before, the group attaches great significance to the truly indigenous character of any anti-Communist movement. This means that the group, on principle and as a matter of practicality, places no reliance on invasions or on external action directed against Guatemala. One of the members of the group, a distinguished political scientist, has consistently maintained that any anti-Communist movement in Guatemala which bore the stamp of an invasion would provoke such public resentment that it would only serve to install Communism permanently in Guatemala; the leaders of the group and the members of it share this point of view. Therefore, one of the primary criteria applied by the group to [] and CALLIGERIS was whether they seemed to have an appreciable and honorable following inside the country. This was determined to the group's satisfaction. In conferences with [] and CALLIGERIS, it was established that they, too, stoutly opposed any thought of invading and that they were thoroughly convinced that popular action against the Guatemalan Communists would have to come from the inside of the country.

The analogy is undoubtedly unfortunate, but it is, historically, the best known available: it is envisaged that CALLIGERIS, something like LENIN, will return from exile to lead the popular anti-Communist movement. At the opportune moment, CALLIGERIS will return to Guatemala and will mobilize his followers from within the country and not from without. The exact manner in which he will do this cannot now, of course, be revealed, but the general

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principle is sufficiently indicated by the analogy. At that time, CALLIGERIS will have his messengers and representatives briefed and in place to solicit the instantaneous support of men such as []

9. A word about the current division of labor between [] and CALLIGERIS: CALLIGERIS has primarily an organizational responsibility, while [] is charged with political planning. At the proper time, CALLIGERIS will be responsible for swift and decisive action, while [] will be responsible for the legal, administrative and political consolidation of the anti-Communist order. This division of labor between the two men is, of course, a provisional one and neither [] nor CALLIGERIS have ever conceived of themselves as anything but willing to receive the assistance, the advice, and the support of new adherents, of comparable stature to their councils. Indeed, both of them have regretted that few men of known reputation and ability have thus far been willing to make their stand clear and they would be the first to welcome and to reward further adherents to their cause.

10. It is clear that neither now nor in the period of victory can there be any selfish haggling or wrangling over posts and privileges. [] and CALLIGERIS throughout have pursued their enterprise with selflessness, no matter what their detractors may say, and they mean to continue to fulfill whatever responsibilities, high or low, at the moment seem necessary to ensure the victory and the permanence of anti-Communism in Guatemala. They will be glad to accept into their ranks anyone who is willing to join in that same spirit. At a later date, of course, definite structure will have to be given to the new regime. Both [] and CALLIGERIS are of the firm opinion that the united will that will lead to victory can also devise an amicable and practical resolution of these lesser problems when the time is appropriate.

11. [] and CALLIGERIS have now been working as a team for over a year. For a part of that time, they were virtually alone and until they were able to mobilize certain demonstrable resources, they did not have the support of the American group. The group has, however, now promised them support until success is obtained, at which time the group will recede from the picture and leave to normal Guatemalan developments and to the normal course of international relations the future of anti-Communism in Guatemala.

3. The above was dictated in haste, in the approximately thirty minutes that were available to the writer between receipt of GUAT 375 and his own departure by plane for consultation at Headquarters. Its defects are all too apparent to the writer. It would be appreciated if Graham L. PAGE would request clarification of specific points by cable.

JEROME C. DUNBAR

JCD/JTN/eaf

21 April 1954

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